Lessons From Georgia: How NigeriaCan Overcome Its Culture of Corruption

Fifty three years after independence, Nigeria has emerged as a country
undermined by the scourge of corruption, so much so that many have
come to see it as in invincible institution.
Anti-corruption crusaders believe, and perhaps justifiably so, that
corruption is an official language in Nigeria. The frequency of
financial scandals - as well as their dimensions - in government
circles, baffle even the most sanguine of citizens. Every sector of
the economy reeks of stench from the rot that is official sleaze, and
as it persists, it manifests itself in acute underdevelopment of the
state, decayed infrastructure and avoidable loss of lives.
The current administration, at inception, vowed to wage a war against
the societal cancer, just like the administration before it and
othersbefore them. From the first military coup in 1966, every
successive government had identified corruption as, not just an issue,
but the major issue in Nigeria. And with such identification came with
- a few times serious, but most often feeble - attempts to curb the
monster. Fifty three years after independence, ours has emerged a
country overran by official corruption, so much so that many have come
to see it as invincible.
But the danger is the scary capacity of corruption to stunt national
growth and drive away foreign investors. Most developed economies have
less cases of corruption than their underdeveloped - or developing -
counterparts. This should inform us of the role transparency in
government will play in our desired journey to national development.
We must fight corruption; it's as simple as that.
Interestingly, we don't necessarily have to reinvent the wheel. We
have a template from Georgia, a country which, in 2003, was described
by the World Bank as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
In fact, the World Bank noted that in Georgia "the price of obtaining
'high rent' positions is well known among public officials and the
general public, suggesting that corruption is deeply
institutionalized. Higher prices are paid for jobs in agencies and
activities that households and enterprises report to be the most
corrupt, suggesting that corrupt officials rationally 'invest' when
buying their public office."
In a survey, it noted that the percentage of "public officials
believedto have purchased their position was close to 50 percent for
customs inspectors, approximately 40 percent for tax inspectors and
ordinary police officials. More than one-third of the offices of
natural resource licensers, judges, investigators and prosecutors were
also believed to have been purchased".
That was such a striking similarity with what currently obtains in
Nigeria where people pay bribes to be able to get employed in
government ministries and parastatals. But, it also seems, the
Georgian case might be worse. The realities were quite scary. In 2012,
Johan Engvall, a researcher of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute &
Silk Road Studies Program, did an elaborate work on Georgia's true
transformation under Mikheil Sakaasvilli.
He writes, "The price for a job in the police is said to have been
ranging from $2,000 - $20,000, depending on the profitability of the
position for sale. Prospective customs officers could pay up to
$10,000 to get their jobs, while officials in the civil registry
offices invested $5,000-$25,000 to get appointed. In the universities,
bribes ranged from $8,000 to $30,000 depending on the prestige of the
program. Since the average monthly salary of a street level bureaucrat
approximated $35-$40, the money invested somehow had to be
retractedunofficially. Structured as a pyramid, revenue obtained from
bribery and extortion would pass upward the pyramid. Thus, the system
was more organized than what met the eye."
Such, and many more details, were thestark reality when Mikheil
Sakaasvilli got swept into power as president by what was popularly
known as the RoseRevolution. He immediately declared asincere war
against corruption, confronting aggressively the criminals of the
state. Of note should be that Sakaasvilli was the justice minister of
the very corrupt regime he succeeded.Being a minister in that regime
also meant that he was familiarwith most of the members of the old
order, yet he wasn't afraid to step on toes, to question assumptions
of the invincibility of official corruption, to return the country to
its citizens. The war he waged was even ruthless at times, but he
waged it all the same. Clearly, it seems, somebody can serve a corrupt
government and still be worthy for a public office in the future,
especially if the person has sufficient love for fatherland to be able
to make a detour from the route the government s/he served
followed.President Sakaasvilli sponsored an anti-mafia bill (the
Georgian mafia operated like Nigeria's subsidy cabal) which was passed
into law by the legislature in February 2005. The law's special
element was that it allowed forplea bargaining and large-scale
confiscation of properties acquired through corrupt and criminal
deals. The essence of this was for the state tobe saved the exorbitant
costs of having to feed and cater for culprits in the nation's
prisons. The law was enforced vigorously, and just within the same
year, heads began to roll. High profile figures such as the former
president's son, former minister of energy, that of transport and
communication, the chairman of the Chamber of Control, the head of the
civil aviation administration, the chief of the state-owned railway
company, the president of the football federation, the president of
the state-owned gold mining company, and some oligarchs were arrested
and prosecuted.
The audacity with which the reforms were implemented struck a unique
impression on observers when the country's President disbanded an
entire police force and replaced it witha new, effective one. The
state secret service was abolished and its remains merged with the
ministry of internal affairs. According to the World Bank report, "a
2010 survey indicates that only 1 percent of Georgia's population
reported having paid a bribe to the road police. Comparable numbers
were 30 percent."
The reforms touched business, the civilservice, and even education,
and their results were amazing. The World Bank, again, reported that
in the sphere of economic policy, "Georgia is the number one economic
reformer in the world. According to the World Bank/IFC's "Ease of
Doing Business" rankings for 2010, and much to the delight of Georgian
leaders, the country rose from 112th to 12th in the world."
Worthy of note is that Sakaasvilli's government rejected World Bank's
economic blueprint, and instead optedto develop his and work with it.
But when they saw the outcome of the government's committed efforts,
the same World Bank did an elaborate report on Georgia's
modernization, and then recommended it as a model for export to other
corruption-ravaged countries.
This is where Nigeria comes in. First, the current administration has
a need to realize that heavens will not fall if corrupt past and
present leaders are prosecuted and given significant jail terms.
Secondly, the most important ingredient in the corruption fight is the
political will from the topmost leader whom associates and friends
would fall back on for intervention when the law enforcement officers
begin to do their jobs.
A state called Bihar in India fought theirs by sponsoring a
legislation that created fast-track courts dedicated to corruption
cases. That way, such cases were heard and concluded speedily, and
over 66,000 people were jailed for acts that bordered on corruption.
Nigeria can commence that immediately. We can create special-purpose
courts that'll give corruption quick attention. And as we do that, the
judges must first be examined, and if found guilty of corruption,
prosecuted for a crime against the state.
With a clean judiciary comes the confidence in the state to be able to
uphold justice and rule of law, two ingredients which presence sends
perpetually on exile sleaze and impunity.
By Chinedu Ekeke